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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COTTONWOOD MALL SHOPPING 
CENTER, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and FRANK S. WARNER and 
OLOF E. ZUNDEL, Commissioners, 
and UTAH POWER & LIGHT 
COMPANY, 
Defendants, 
Case No. 14568 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case originated in a proceeding before the Public 
Service Commission of Utah wherein the plaintiff, Cottonwood Mall 
Shopping Center, Inc., filed an application seeking a certificate 
of convenience and necessity to operate as a public utility 
supplying electric service to its shopping center and to the 
individual offices and stores located therein, or, in the alterna-
tive, for a finding by the Commission that such proposed service 
would be exempt from application of the public utility laws of 
this state and would not be subject to regulation by the Commission. 
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
A motion to dismiss the application was filed by defen-
dant Utah Power & Light Company, a duly certificated supplier of 
electric service in Salt Lake County and the present supplier of 
all electric service to plaintiff's shopping center and the 
stores and offices located therein. Said motion was heard by the 
Commission on February 24, 1976, and the Commission, by its order 
dated March 10, 1976, granted same with respect only to the 
alternative prayer of the application which seeks a determination 
that the proposed service would not be subject to regulation. 
The Commission did not grant or deny the motion to dismiss with 
respect to the remaining prayer of the application which seeks 
the grant to applicant of a certificate of convenience and necessity 
to operate as a public utility, and ruling on that issue was 
deferred. Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for rehearing and 
reconsideration and same was denied by the Commission by its 
order dated April 15, 1976. Plaintiff thereupon sought this review. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Commission's order 
which granted defendant's motion to dismiss with respect to that 
portion of plaintiff's application which sought a determination 
by the Commission that plaintiff's proposed supplying of electric 
service would be exempt from regulation by the Commission. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's brief contains almost six pages of gra-
tuitous recitations, comments, explanations, assertions and 
theories under the index heading ''Statement of Fact.11 Defendant 
does not agree with such statement or any portion thereof. There 
are no facts to be submitted for the Court's review in this case. 
This proceeding is based solely on an order of the Commission 
issued after argument of a motion to dismiss. The hearing on 
said motion involved only arguments by counsel. No testimony was 
presented and no exhibits were offered or received in evidence. 
There have been no proceedings in the matter other than the 
aforesaid argument of this defendant's motion to dismiss, and 
there is no evidence whatever appearing in the record of this 
case before the Commission. The status of the case was clearly 
explained on the record by the Chairman of the Public Service 
Commission when, near the end of the hearing, he stated as 
follows: 
I might just say so the record is clear that 
these allegations of fact made by either 
party really have no force or effect on the 
Commission's ruling in this matter because 
this is not a fact hearing. Nobody's attempted 
to present any evidence. This is simply an 
argument of law and the Commission is only 
looking at the law in determining how to rule 
in this matter. (Transcript, p. 34) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH CORRECTLY HELD THAT 
A RULING OF THE FEDERAL COURT IN AN ACTION INVOLVING THE 
SAME PARTIES AND THE SAME ISSUES AS INVOLVED IN THE INSTANT 
PROCEEDING IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED HEREIN 
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 
The pending case before the Court represents another 
phase of a long-standing controversy between the parties. Such 
controversy has involved various actions and proceedings before 
state and federal courts and the legislature of the state of 
Utah. 
In 1968 the plaintiff herein filed an action against 
this defendant in the United States District Court for the District 
of Utah (Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center v. Utah Power & Light 
Company, Civil No. 229-68). Such action, based on an alleged 
violation of federal anti-trust laws, contended that the defendant 
herein conspired to supress and eliminate competition from the 
plaintiff by various alleged actions designed to prevent plaintiff 
from operating its power plant and supplying electric service to 
defendant's present customers and prospective customers located 
in the Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center. Defendant filed a motion 
to dismiss said action and on July 11, 1969, the court issued its 
decree which granted summary judgment against plaintiff and dis-
missed the complaint with prejudice and on its merits. The 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of the United 
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States District Court are set forth in full in the appendix 
hereto. 
An inherent issue in the federal court case was whether 
or not the plaintiff was entitled, under the laws of the state 
of Utah, to furnish electrical power to the Cottonwood Mall 
Shopping Center without having first acquired a certificate of 
public convenience and necessity, as required by statute, permitting 
it to supply such service as a public utility. In that regard, 
the court found and concluded that plaintiff was not so entitled 
and that if plaintiff was permitted to generate and distribute 
electric energy, as it proposed to do, it would be an "electrical 
corporation11 and "public utility" as defined in §54-2-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and could not legally construct 
or operate an electrical system without first securing a certi-
ficate of public convenience and necessity as required by §54-4-
25(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. Such determination 
relates to the same issue subsequently presented in the instant 
proceeding to the Public Service Commission; that is, whether or 
not under Utah law the plaintiff1s proposed supplying of electric 
service would be exempt from application of the statefs public 
utility laws and therefore exempt from regulation by the Commis-
sion. The Commission, by its order, held that such issue had 
already been specifically determined by a court of law and there-
fore refused to further consider same and granted defendant's 
motion to dismiss as same related to that issue. 
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The decision of the federal district court was appealed 
by plaintiff to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, and that court, in a decision issued on March 12, 1971 
(440 F.2d 36), fully considered the applicable Utah statutes and 
cases and affirmed the federal district court decision. At this 
point, then, a federal district court and a federal court of 
appeals had both determined that plaintiff's proposed supplying 
of electric service would not be exempt from application of the 
state's public utility laws and the regulation attendant thereto. 
Plaintiff then sought to have the matter further 
reviewed by the United States Supreme Court and on October 12, 
1971, plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari was denied. 
(30 L.Ed 2d 99). 
The order of the Public Service Commission (R. 123) was 
based on the doctrine of res judicata in that the issue presented 
by plaintiff to the Commission had been specifically reviewed and 
determined by a court of law in a prior action involving the same 
parties and the same issues, among others, as are involved in the 
instant action. 
The doctrine of res judicata is well established in 
Utah and has been repeatedly recognized and applied by this Court 
as in, for instance, Mathews v. Mathews, 132 P.2d 111 (Utah, 
1942), where the Court quoted at length from Ruling Case Law as 
follows: 
The foundation principle upon which the 
doctrine of res judicata rests is that 
parties ought not to be permitted to litigate 
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the same issue more than once; that, when a 
right or fact has been judicially tried and 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, 
or an opportunity for such trial has been 
given, the judgment of the court, so long as 
it remains unreversed, should be conclusive 
upon the parties, and those in privity with 
them in law or estate. * * * Public policy 
and the interest of litigants alike require 
that there be an end to litigation, and the 
peace and order of society demand that matters 
distinctly put in issue and determined by a 
court of competent jurisdiction as to parties 
and subject matter shall not be retried 
between the same parties in any subsequent 
suit in any court. 15 R.C.L. 953, Sec. 430. 
The applicability of the doctrine is unaffected by the 
fact that the initial proceeding was before a federal court and 
the subsequent proceeding was before a state administrative 
agency. While there does not appear to be a Utah precedent on 
the subject, it is well established that a determination in a 
federal action may be res judicata in a subsequent state action. 
The following cases have so held: Harrell vt Rockett (La. 1953), 
65 So.2d 670, King v. Grindstaff (N.C. 1973), 200 SE 2d 799, 
Ham v. Holy Rosary Hospital (Mont. 1974), 529 P.2d 361, Robinson 
v. Brown (Ala. 1976), 328 So.2d 291, Chamberlin of Pittsburgh v. 
Fort Pitt Chemical Co. (Pa. 1976), 352 A.2d 176. 
The Ham v. Holy Rosary Hospital ca^e, supra, is a 1974 
Montana decision that, while factually different, is very similar 
to the instant case in its procedural aspects. That case involved 
a suit filed in federal district court in Montana seeking an 
order compelling the hospital to permit a doctor to perform a 
surgical sterilization. The court dismissed the same and in its 
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opinion made certain findings on constitutional issues. Plaintiffs 
then filed a complaint in state district court seeking the same 
relief and raising the same constitutional issues. The state 
district court granted the hospital's motion to dismiss on the 
basis of res judicata and on appeal the Montana Supreme Court 
affirmed and held that the federal court's determination of the 
subject constitutional issues was conclusive and such determination 
by the federal court was res judicata in the state action. 
While it may be argued that res judicata is not applic-
able here because the two actions involved were based on different 
claims for relief, the doctrine nevertheless applies insofar as 
the same specific issues were involved in both actions. 46 Am. Jur. 
2d, Judgments, Section 415. H. Knight v. Flat Top Mining Company, 
305 P.2d 503 (Utah, 1957). A specific issue in both the federal 
court and Public Service Commission proceedings was whether or 
not plaintiff's proposed supplying of electric service was exempt 
from application of the state's public utility laws. 
Further, the rule of res judicata applies to all judicial 
determinations whether made in actions or in special or summmary 
proceedings. Braine v. Stroud, 385 P.2d 428 (Oklahoma). Appli-
cation of the doctrine is not dependent on the form of litigation 
in which the adjudication was made. The rule is well stated in 
46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, Section 467, as follows: 
It is also worthy of notice that, with respect 
to the preclusion of the relitigation of 
identical issues in a subsequent action 
between the same parties, or their privies, 
it is immaterial that the two actions have a 
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different scope, involve different forms of a 
proceeding, are based on different grounds, 
are tried on different theories, ate instituted 
for different purposes, or seek different 
relief. 
This court, in a quiet title action involving mining 
claims (H. Knight v. Flat Top Mining Company, supra) found that 
certain issues with respect to such claims had been determined in 
a prior action and were therefore binding even though one of the 
parties to the second action was not a party to the prior action 
but was a successor in interest to one of sucth prior parties. 
The court quoted with approval from 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, 
Section 920, as follows: 
It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence 
that material facts or questions which were 
in issue in a former action, and were there 
admitted or judicially determined, are conclu-
sively settled by a judgment rendered therein, 
and that such facts or questions become res 
judicata and may not again be litigated in a 
subsequent action between the same parties or 
their privies, regardless of the form the 
issue may take in a subsequent action, * * * 
Plaintiff!s brief indicates that the federal court 
decision of the prior litigation between the parties was made 
without the hearing of any evidence. While such decision was 
made pursuant to defendant's motion and summary judgment granted 
thereon, it should be noted that the decree (Appendix, A-5) 
specifically states that depositions, affidavits and memoranda of 
law were received and same were examined by the court. 
Plaintiff's brief, in Point I of the Argument thereof, 
contends that the Commission was in error in applying res judicata, 
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especially "since some of the facts upon which the ruling was 
based have changed." Plaintifffs argument in Point I then pro-
ceeds to recite certain "facts" with reference to changes of 
ownership of certain property located within the shopping center. 
Such recitation is purely gratuitous inasmuch as nc) evidence 
whatever has at this stage of the proceeding been presented to or 
received by the Commission. As the record indicates, this appeal 
was taken following a ruling and order on defendants motion to 
dismiss. The hearing consisted only of oral arguments by counsel 
and submission by plaintiff of a document entitled "Argument on 
Petition to Find Applicant a Nonutility and Answer to Protes-
tant's Motion to Dismiss." No witnesses have testified in the 
proceedings thus far, and no depositions, affidavits, exhibits or 
other evidence has been presented. Accordingly, no new evidence 
has been submitted for consideration by the Commission by this 
Court, and the only evidence that has. been submitted in the 
long-standing controversy between the parties was duly considered 
and a determination made thereon by a court of law in the prior 
federal court action. 
Plaintiff's brief cites Lloyd Corp. Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 
U.S. 551, 31 L.Ed. 2d 131, as a United States Supreme Court case 
which completely overrules the decision in Cottonwood Mall Shopping 
Center v. Utah Power & Light Company, supra. That case deals 
with the denial by a shopping center of a right to distribute 
within the center handbills protesting the draft and the Viet Nam 
war. It was held in a five to four decision that there had been 
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no dedication of the Mall property to public use so as to permit 
the distribution therein of handbills unrelated to the shopping 
center operations and such denial, therefore, did not constitute 
a violation of constitutional safeguards of the right of free 
speech. 
The Lloyd case is vastly different from the instant 
proceeding both from a factual standpoint and in the very nature 
of the controversy involved and certainly cannot be regarded as a 
precedent applicable to the case now before the Court. At the 
outset, an essential element set forth in the Supreme Court 
decision in Lloyd was that the claimed First Amendment rights of 
those desiring to distribute handbills were totally unrelated to 
the shopping center's operations and had no Relation to any 
purpose for which the center was built and b^ing used. The 
narrow scope of the Lloyd case holding would be unduly broadened 
if, as plaintiff contends, such holding should be extended to 
include the present situation involving the supply of a state 
regulated public service to the shopping center and its lessees 
and tenants. Such circumstance is clearly related to the shopping 
center!s operation and to the purpose for which it was built and 
is being used. An equally important distinction is apparent in 
that in the Lloyd case there were no state statutes bearing upon 
the respective rights of the parties while in the instant pro-
ceeding such rights are clearly dependent upon the application 
and interpretation of this state's public utility laws. 
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In view of the foregoing, it is apparent that the 
decision in the Lloyd case is clearly not applicable to the 
present controversy before the Court and offers no escape from 
application of the doctrine of res judicata to the issue upon 
which this appeal is based. 
POINT II 
THE ORDER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED SUPPLYING OF 
ELECTRIC SERVICE WOULD NOT BE EXEMPT FROM 
APPLICATION OF PUBLIC UTILITY LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
While the Court, at this stage of the proceeding, 
does not have the benefit of reviewing any evidence bearing on 
this controversy, an examination of applicable statutes, as 
applied to issues raised by the pleadings, clearly confirms that 
the subject Public Service Commission order correctly determined, 
irrespective of res judicata, that plaintifffs proposed supply of 
electric service vrould not be exempt from regulation. 
The law relative to regulation of public utilities in 
this state has been well defined during the long period of time 
since creation of the Public Service Commission in 1917. During 
that extended period there have been few changes in the law 
regarding jurisdiction of the Commission over electric utilities. 
This area of the law, therefore, has been basically unchanged, 
for a period of almost sixty years, during which time fundamental 
regulatory concepts in the state of Utah have become well established 
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Although plaintifffs brief comments at length regarding 
the pro-free enterprise and anti-regulation attitudes of the framers 
of the state's constitution, the inescapable fact remains that 
subsequent legislatures have, in the public interest, adopted a 
policy of governmental regulation in many areas and have established 
and continue to establish broad layers of state regulation of a 
variety of business, individual and public pursuits. Such regulation 
and the need for same is well established in the area of public 
utilities. This Court's recognition of the regulatory structure 
in Utah is apparent in many cases, and a particularly exhaustive 
analysis of "public convenience and necessity1' was made in Mulcahy 
v. Public Service Commission, 117 P.2d 298 (Utah, 1941). 
The basic purpose and intent of the public utility laws 
that were adopted by Utah and its sister states early in this 
century were clearly and succinctly stated in the case of Idaho 
Power & Light Company v. Blomquist, 141 P. 10^3, as follows: 
The general impression has been that competi-
tion was supposed to be a legitimate and 
proper means of protecting the interests of 
the public and promoting the general welfare 
of the people in respect to service by public 
utility corporations; but history and experience 
has clearly demonstrated that public convenience 
and the necessities of the community do not 
require the construction and maintenance of 
several plants or systems of the same character 
to supply a city of the same locality, but that 
public convenience and necessity require only 
the maintenance of a sufficient number of 
such instrumentalities to meet the public 
demands. If more than one instrumentality is 
to be sustained when one is amply sufficient, 
the actual cost to the public served is not 
only necessarily greater than it would be 
under one system, but also less convenient. 
If public convenience and necessity do not 
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demand a duplication of power systems, why 
should the public be burdened with the expense 
of maintaining such duplicate systems, and 
the annoyance of perpetual solicitation to 
make or break contracts for service, and the 
inconvenience to the people of the occupation 
of the streets and alleys of a town or city 
by such corporations in constructing and 
keeping in repair the two systems? 
The public utilities act merely declares the 
will of the people, as expressed through the 
Legislature, to the effect that competition 
between public utility corporations of the 
classes specified shall be allowed only where 
public convenience and necessity demand it, 
and in any case the commission is thereby 
given power to fix the rates to be charged, 
which cannot be varied by such corporations. 
The Legislature has concluded by the passage 
of said act that it is not for the best 
interests of the people or the public welfare 
to permit public utility corporations to 
compete with each other where public con-
venience and necessity do not require such 
competition. * * * 
The Utah Code defines the term "electrical corporation'1 
and then defines "public utility" as including an "electrical 
corporation" and declares that any such public utility is subject 
to regulation by the Commission under §54-2-1(30), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. Initially, therefore, a deter-
mination must be made as to whether or not the plaintiff by 
providing its proposed electric service would be an "electrical 
corporation" and, as such, a "public utility". Section 54-2-
1(20), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, defines electrical 
corporation as follows: 
(20) The term "electrical corporation" 
includes every corporation, cooperative 
association and person, their lessees, 
trustees and receivers or trustees appointed 
by any court whatsoever, owning, controlling, 
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operating or managing any electric plant, or 
in anywise furnishing electrical power, for 
public service or to its consumers or members 
for domestic, commercial or industrial use, 
within this state except where electricity is 
generated on or distributed by the producer 
through private property alone, i.e,, property 
not dedicated to public use, solely for his 
own use, or the use of his tenants, or by an 
association of unit owners under the "condominium 
ownership act,M chapter 11, Laws of Utah, 
1963 (57-8-1 to 57-8-35), and not for sale to 
others. 
The only significant changes in the above section since enactment 
in 1917 were 1965 amendments that included cooperative associa-
tions within the definition of electrical corporation and created 
an exemption from the definition for associations of condominium 
unit owners. It is noted that to be an "electrical corporation," 
an entity need not sell electric power, it neqd only furnish 
same, and further, it need not be furnished to the general public 
but only to "consumers." Since plaintiff proposes to operate an 
electric plant and furnish electric power to consumers for 
commercial use, plaintiff clearly falls within the basic defi-
nition of an electrical corporation as set forth in the statute. 
Therefore, unless plaintiff can come within the recognized 
exception to that definition, plaintiff cannot provide the 
proposed service to defendantfs customers in the Cottonwood Mall 
without obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity. 
The key phrase of the foregoing definition of electrical corpora-
tion upon which plaintiff relies for its claimed exempt status 
is ". . . except where electricity is generated on or distributed by 
the producer through private property above, i.e., property not 
- 16 -
dedicated to public use, solely for his own use or use of his 
tenants, . . .If 
In order to uphold plaintiff's contention, the broad 
assumption must be made that the Utah Legislature in 1917 intended 
to exempt an electrical power production and distribution opera-
tion on the scale contemplated by plaintiff. Such an assumption 
would be unwarranted and unjustifiable. Suburban shopping malls 
were unknown in 1917. Condominium ownership was likewise unknown 
at that time, but the Legislature in 1965 appropriately amended 
the statute to provide for same. No such amendment has been 
enacted with reference to shopping malls and in this regard the 
1917 language remains intact. A reasonable construction of such 
language, considering the date of enactment of the statute, is 
that the Legislature intended to exempt service to certain types 
of facilities then existing, such as apartment and office buildings, 
from application of the statute. It does not appear reasonable 
to assume that the 1917 Legislature intended the "tenant11 exemp-
tion to apply to a large multi-building complex of some seventy 
retail stores and offices encompassed in a facility that conducts 
not only general retail merchandising but also engages in a wide 
variety of nonmerchandising civic and social activities open to 
the public without charge. The nature of these activities are 
set forth in the Tenth Circuit Court opinion in Cottonwood Mall 
Shopping Center v. Utah Power & Light Company, supra, where at 
440 F.2d page 39 the Court states: 
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In the past the Board (of Cottonwood Mall 
Merchants* Association) has authorized a 
whole gamut of activities including auto-
mobile shows, small car races, sidewalk 
sales, garden shows, boat shows, stamp shows, 
Indian dances, a circus, art displays, and 
handicraft shows. Also, the auditorium at 
the Center has been used by many religious, 
civic, social and political groups to hold 
gatherings, dances, and the like, a large 
number of which took place after stbre 
closing hours. 
A footnote to the foreoging excerpt states that nCottonwood?s 
brief gives a more complete list" and then sets forth a long list 
of activities similar to those enumerated in the Court!s opinion. 
It is clear from the nature of the shopping mall operation that 
the electrical power proposed to be there generated and distributed 
would not be used solely by the mall owner and its tenants, which 
sole use is essential for application of the exemption upon which 
plaintiff relies. 
Defendant's contention that the 1917 Legislature did 
not contemplate an exemption for the electric service proposed to 
be supplied by plaintiff, particularly since the type of facility 
for which such service is contemplated was then unknown, appears 
fully warranted in view of amendments that have been made to the 
definition of "electrical corporation.,! Prior to 1965, the 
condominium form of ownership was not a factor that required 
legislative attention with regard to utility service. Such was 
also the case with regard to electrical servic^ being supplied by 
a cooperative association to its members, and this Court held in 
Garkane Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, 100 P.2d 571, that 
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such organizations were not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission. As circumstances changed with regard to condominiums 
and cooperative associations, and with the inability of the 
existing statute to accommodate such changes, the Legislature 
enacted amendments for that purpose. In 1965 the narrow exceptions 
from the definition of "electrical corporation11 were broadened to 
include an association of condominium owners, and the entities to 
be included in the definition were expanded to include cooperative 
associations. Further, where the former statute termed "electrical 
corporation" as one who furnished electrical power for public 
service, the 1965 amendment added language to include also one 
who furnishes electric power to its "consumers or members for 
domestic, commercial or industrial use." The Legislature obviously 
intended by such amendments (1) to expand the jurisdiction of the 
Commission to provide that any organization, other than those 
specifically exempted, supplying electric power for public service 
or for use by consumers and members would be an "electrical 
corporation" and as such subject to regulation as a public utility 
by the Public Service Commission, and (2) to provide a specific 
exemption for electric service supplied to a new form of property 
ownership, which exemption was not covered by the language of the 
narrow existing exception to those entities classified as "electrical 
corporations." 
Construing the reach of §54-2-1(20), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended ("electrical corporation" definition) broadly, 
and strictly limiting the scope of the exeptions thereto, would 
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seem to be consistent with the basic rationale of public utility 
regulation and the intent of the Legislature as manifest by the 
history of the statute. Such an interpretation would also be 
consistent with the well established rule of statutory construction 
enunciated by the court in Bird & Jex Co., et ai. , v. Funk, et al., 
85 P.2d 831, 96 Utah 450 (1939), that: 
A proviso which operates to limit the applica-
tion of the provisions of a statute, general 
in their terms, should be strictly construed 
to include no case not within the letter of 
the proviso. 
or as stated by the Supreme Court of Kansas in Broadliurst Foundation 
v. New Hope Baptist Society, 397 P.2d 360 (Kansas, 1964): 
. . . The statutes must, of course, be con-
strued in their entirety with a view of 
giving effect to the legislative intent. It 
must be remembered that ordinarily a strict 
or narrow interpretation is applied to 
statutory exceptions. (50 Am. Jur., Statutes, 
Section 431, p. 451). In construing a 
statute, any doubt should be resolved against 
the exception, and anyone claiming to be 
relieved from the statute!s operation must 
establish that he comes within the Exception. 
(Crawford, Statutory Construction, §299, p. 
610). 
The intent of the Legislature, with respect to the 
subject statute, appears clear. Having amended the statute in 
two respects relative to new or changed conditions (condominiums 
and cooperative associations) which have occurred or developed 
since enactment of the statute, and the absence of any similar 
action with respect to another new condition (suburban shopping 
centers) would indicate the intention to retain and preserve a 
broad category of electric suppliers classified as "electrical 
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cooperatives1' and to strictly limit those suppliers excepted from 
such classification. 
CONCLUSION 
The Public Service Commission of Utah, by its order 
dated March 10, 1976, correctly determined, under Utah law, that 
defendant's motion to dismiss should be granted insofar as it 
related to the alternative prayer of plaintiff's application 
seeking a determination by the Commission that the electric 
service proposed to be supplied by plaintiff would not be subject 
to regulation by the Commission, and the Commission's order 
dismissing that portion of the application should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SIDNEY G. BAUCOM 
ROBERT GORDON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Utah Power & Light Company 
P. 0. Box 899 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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copies of same, postage prepaid, to Keith E. Sohm, Attorney for 
Plaintiff, Suite #81, Trolley Square, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, 
and to G. Blaine Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
--0O0 
COTTONWOOD MALL SHOPPING CENTER : 
INC., a Utah corporation, : 
Plaintiff, \ FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, : Civil No. C-229-68 
a Maine corporation, : 
Defendant. : 
0O0 
Defendantfs motion to dismiss came on for hearing the 
8th day of May, 1969, before the Honorable Willis W. Ritter, 
Chief Judge. Plaintiff and third party defendants were represented 
by Brigham E. Roberts of the firm of Rawlings, Roberts & Black; 
the defendant was represented by Marvin J. Bertoch and Thomas A. 
Quinn of the firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker and by Sidney G. 
Baucom and Robert Gordon of the firm of Baucom, Gordon & Porter. 
Depositions, affidavits and memoranda of law were pre-
sented and not excluded, and arguments were made by counsel. 
Having examined the depositions, affidavits and memoranda of law 
and listened to the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby makes 
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff owns a shopping center in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and with the exception of an area located 
within the center which is owned by Eldredge Furniture Company, 
The plaintiff constructed the buildings located in the shopping 
center and leases them to approximately seventy different tenants, 
and has sold one of the properties to the Eldredge Furniture 
Company. 
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2. Since 1961, defendant has supplied electrical power 
to the tenants and owners occupying the Cottonwood Mall Shopping 
Center. 
3. Plaintiff in 1968 and 1969 installed a power plant 
on the premises, and by this lawsuit seeks to compete with the 
defendant in supplying electrical power for use in the shopping 
center, 
4. Defendant, having expended approximately $558,000.00 
in capital investment to supply the center with electricity, is 
equipped and able and desires to continue to provide all of the 
electrical power needed for present and future use in the shopping 
center. 
5. The sole issue submitted to this Court by defendant's 
motion to dismiss, which the Court under Rule 12(b), Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, will treat as a motion for summary 
judgment, is whether or not the plaintiff has the right under 
Title 54, Utah Code Annotated, to compete with the defendant in 
the furnishing of electrical power in the Cottonwood Mall Shopping 
Center. 
6. The Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center consists of 
approximately seventy stores and offices, which sell merchandise 
of various types and supply professional services to thousands of 
members of the general public. The stores include such large 
department stores as Z.C.M.I and J. C. Penney Company, plus 
grocery stores, clothing stores, drug stores, restaurants and 
various other types of stores commonly found in a large shopping 
center. The premises include a large electrically lighted parking 
lot. In addition, numerous persons other than shoppers are 
attributed to and use the facilities of the center for such 
activities as automobile shows, Junior Achievement fairs, garden 
and flower shows, boat shows, Go-Kart shows, stamp shows, Indian 
dancers, art and ceramic shows, bazaars, Halloween parades and 
other similar activities classified by the manager of the Cotton-
wood Mall Merchants Association as "traffic building events." 
Other activities are routinely allowed on the premises such as 
high school seminary dances, dances sponsored by the Latter-day 
Saints Church stakes, square dances, firemen's balls and Easter 
sunrise services, all of which are carried on when the stores are 
not open and are not considered by the manager of the Cottonwood 
Mall Merchants Association as "traffic building events." 
7. If plaintiff were permitted to furnish electric 
power as it proposes to do, it would not be providing electric 
power "solely for its own use, or the use of its tenants" in 
contemplation of 54-2-1(20), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
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Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
makes the following Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. 54-2-1(20), 54-2-1(29) (now 54-2-1(30)), and 54-4-
25(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, are the controlling statutes. 
They read as follows: 
Statutes omitted in this Appendix. 
54-2-1(20) - Definition of "electrical corporation" 
§54-2-1(29) (now §54-2-1(30)) - Definition of "public 
utility" 
§54-2-25(1) - Requirement for Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity 
2. The plaintiff, if permitted to generate and distri-
bute electric power as it proposes to do, would be an "electric 
corporation" in contemplation of 54-2-1(20), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, and would be a "public utility" in contemplation of 54-2-
1(29) (now 54-2-1(30)), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and could not 
legally construct an electrical plant or system or generate or 
distribute electricity without first acquiring a certificate of 
public convenience and necessity as required by 54-4-25(1), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. 
3. Plaintiff has not been granted & certificate of 
public convenience and necessity and is not entitled under the 
law to be granted such a certificate for the generation or 
distribution of electricity to serve the Cottonwood Mall Shopping 
Center. 
4. It was not the intention of the Utah Legislature in 
adopting 54-2-1(20), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to allow persons 
to avoid the supervision and regulation of the Public Service 
Commission in connection with supplying electrical service to 
large shopping centers. It is a purpose of Utah law involving 
public utilities to protect users of electricity with respect to 
rates and quality of service. The legislature and the law intend 
that such protection be supplied to such users as those occupying 
the Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center. 
5. The defendant is authorized by law to serve the 
users of electricity in the Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center and 
is entitled under the law to provide the exclusive electrical 
service to all users of electricity in the Cottonwood Mall Shopping 
Center, and accordingly is not in violation of any antitrust law 
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and not illegally interfering with or violating any of plaintiff's 
rights in so doing. 
6. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment against 
the plaintiff dismissing the plaintiff's complaint and for its 
costs incurred herein. 
DATED this 11th day of July, 1969. 
/s/ Willis W. Ritter 
Judge 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
0O0 
COTTONWOOD MALL SHOPPING CENTER 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
a Maine corporation, 
Defendant. 
D E C R E E 
Civil No. C-229-68 
-oOo-
Defendant's motion to dismiss came on for hearing on 
the 8th day of May, 1969, before the Honorable Willis W. Ritter, 
Chief Judge. Plaintiff and Third party defendants were repre-
sented by Brigham E. Roberts of the firm of Rawlings, Roberts & 
Black; the defendant was represented by Marvin J. Bertoch and 
Thomas A. Quinn of the firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, and by 
Sidney G. Baucom and Robert Gordon. 
Depositions, affidavits and memoranda of law were 
presented and not excluded, and arguments were made by counsel. 
Depositions and affidavits having been received, defendants 
motion, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 12(b), Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, will be treated as a motion for summary 
judgment and disposed of under the provisions of Rule 56, Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Court, having examined the depositions, affidavits 
and memoranda of law, and having listened to the arguments of 
counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, . 
And the Court expressly determined that there is no 
just reason for delay, and the Court expressly directs that this 
Decree be entered as a final decree pursuant to the terms and 
provisions of Rule 54(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant, Utah Power & Light 
Company, be, and is hereby granted summary judgment against 
plaintiff, the complaint of the plaintiff is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice and on its merits, costs to be paid by the plaintiff. 
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Dated this 11th day of July, 1969. 
/s/ Willis W. Ritter 
Judge 
